Present mechanisms intended to control land use in the United States have been sharply criticized.' Traditional regulatory devices have in many ways failed to control development, produce an economic use of resources, or provide adequate facilities for a growing metropolitan population.
goals as defined by statute and dispositions that exclude certain uses or groups from an area in conflict with general state policies. In jurisdictions that have already authorized land banking," effective judicial review is necessary for achieving the statutory goals and controlling abuse. Where land banking programs are being considered, 7 the effectiveness of judicial review is an important factor in determining both the desirability of land banking and the form of a land bank system.
I. PUBLIC LAND BANKING

A. Background and Current Proposals
In a public land banking system 8 a governmental entity, which can be an agency of the state, county, or metropolitan government or an independent public corporation, 9 is endowed with authority to acquire, hold, develop, and dispose of land. The entity uses this authority to exercise direct control over the development of the region and indirect control over the development of nearby regions.' 0 In the first phase of the process, the land bank predicts in general terms the probable and desirable growth patterns of the region. Next, appropriate tracts of land, usually undeveloped, are acquired by purchase, transfer from other government agencies, or eminent domain. This land is then held in reserve, or "banked," until the development situation is ripe for its release. During the holding period it may be plotted and subdivided, and streets, sewers, and other public improvements may be constructed. Finally, the land is transferred under deeds or leases that contain conditions designed to assure that the land use conforms to the development objectives."
Land banking is intended to achieve three general goals. The first is control of urban development patterns. 12 Control over time, location, and type of development allows the land bank to create an effective sequence and arrangement of uses on a local and regional basis. A second goal, related to the determination of land uses, is assurance of an adequate level of all land uses needed in an area. 13 For example, the land bank can provide for an adequate supply of low and middle income housing.
1 4 Finally, land banking can benefit public finances in two ways: centralized control over timing and installation of public services results in economies of scale,'" and governmental ownership and resale permits capture of the appreciation in land value caused by government action in aid of growth.'( Land bank enabling legislation and development plans define these goals more precisely and establish priorities among goals. The statute sets forth the policies that the land bank is to pursue, 17 and the development plan applies the legislative intent to specific areas by establishing policies on land acquisition and disposition, future uses, and timing. 14 This may be done either directly or indirectly through stabilization of the market in raw land and elimination of the speculative profits that discourage construction of low and middle income housing. See Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 935-38.
and its effectiveness has been demonstrated in foreign nations. 20 Reform proposals based on land banking have become more urgent and widespread as the problems caused by inadequate regulation of land use have become more acute. The intense debate of the 1930s and 1940s over public ownership and control of land 2 ' has been revived with considerable intensity. Commentators and commissions have urged that governments employ public acquisition and disposition of land to control and channel urban development. 22 Citizen groups have presented proposals for public land banks in individual cities and states. 23 Several state legislatures have responded with enabling legislation for land reserve agencies. 24 Congress, in the Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970,2, sought to remove financial barriers that had prevented many areas from adopting land banking. 29 the location and amount of land to be transferred; the interest to be transferred; the time of the transfer; the price; the uses to be prescribed or prohibited; the method of assuring use after disposition; and the process by which the transferee is selected. An individual disposition decision may be objectionable either because it causes misdevelopment or because it unjustifiably excludes some group or use.
Misdevelopment occurs when a disposition, or lack of disposition, is inconsistent with the legitimate legislative objectives of the land bank. 30 One source of misdevelopment is official wrongdoing; officials in charge of land use regulation have been unusually susceptible to graft, conflict of interest, and political bias because of the large financial interests involved and the broad range of arguably correct decisions. 31 Also, in land banking, developers seeking advantageous dispositions and public officials seeking personal or political profit may try to influence the timing and type of dispositions for personal gain. A less venal source of misdevelopment is disregard for planning considerations. Land use regulation has often been controlled by nonprofessionals who fail to consider the complex factors involved in regulation. 32 In addition, the actions of individual decision makers may be swayed by personal inclinations in favor of particular land use patterns.
Objections to a disposition may also be based on its exclusionary ef- 
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The University of Chicago Law Review fect. 33 The frequent efforts of suburban communities to protect their "tight little islands" 34 by exclusionary zoning indicates the importance of this problem. 35 The absolute control over development offered by land banking makes it an ideal tool for various exclusionary purposes. In a well-functioning system, judicial review will not be the primary constraint on land bank dispositions; decisions would be influenced primarily by specific statutory restrictions on dispositions 3 0 and the procedures required for decision making. 37 These controls alone are unlikely, however, to assure proper disposition of banked land. Experience has shown that even the most elaborate and carefully planned administrative procedures do not prevent improper action. 38 In addition, legislation prescribing all disposition decisions in detail would deprive the land bank of needed flexibility. 39 Judicial review will be needed to control dispositions that necessarily involve some exercise of discretion by regulatory officials. 33 Although virtually any group or use may be excluded, exclusion is used here to refer to restriction of low and moderate income housing, often with racially discriminatory effect, and to severe limitation of an area's population growth. National Land & Inv. 36 For example, under the Model Land Development Code land may not be transferred pursuant to negotiated sales tainted by conflict of interest. Reporters' Draft, supra note 26, at § 6-407(4). Other restrictions include a maximum period of time for which land may be held before disposition. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 311f(q) (1964) . 37 The Model Land Development Code provides a detailed description of decisionmaking procedures. The State Land Planning Agency must consent to all dispositions except public sales, transfers to government agencies, short-term leases, return of land to condemnees, and transactions concerning land held beyond the statutory period. Reporters' Draft, supra note 26, at § 6-401. Specific procedures are mandated for other types of disposition. Id. at § § 6-402 to -407. The most detailed provisions apply to disposition by negotiated purchase, because this area is subject to the greatest abuse. Id. at § 6-407. After the State Land Reserve Agency negotiates with the proposed purchaser, the State Land Planning Agency holds a public hearing on all matters concerning the sale. The State Land Planning Agency approves the sale only if it finds the terms fair and in accordance with the development plan. Id.
38 For a discussion of the role of judicial review of actions in the administrative process, see L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 320-27 (1965). The multitude of cases finding improper zoning decisions that were made in an elaborate procedural framework testify to the need for judicial scrutiny. The right to challenge a land disposition may be defined in the land bank enabling statute. 40 In the absence of such a provision, the state statute or case law regulating review of administrative actions will prevail. 41 The same parties are likely to be permitted to bring suit under either formulation 4 2 but an affirmative provision in the enabling statute may eliminate needless confusion.
Although constitutional limitations on land bank dispositions are inadequate, 43 the courts have a number of possible models to draw on in determining the proper standard for nonconstitutional review of dispositions. For example, the courts could adopt either a substitution of judgment test or a standard involving deference to the disposition decision. Consideration of the nature of the development plan and disposition decisions 44 and analogy to courts' review of zoning decisions 45 suggest the appropriate standard of review.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON LAND BANK DISPOSITIONS
The United States Constitution and most state constitutions impose some restraints on land bank dispositions. 40 The major constitutional limitations on dispositions depend to some extent on the method of government acquisition of the land being disposed of. Land may be 40 Tent. Draft No. 3, supra note 3, at § 9-103 suggests that a challenge to a disposition may be brought by any party to the hearing on the disposition before the land bank agency or by a party with significant interest that has been injured and that was not adequately represented in the administrative proceeding. Section 2-304(5) allows established community organizations and others with significant interests to participate in the hearings and thereby in a subsequent court proceeding.
41 In some states, this will require an express reference to the state administrative procedure law in the land bank statute. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 265 (1971). In others, the land bank as a state agency will automatically be subject to the provisions for review. 46 This discussion deals only with the constitutional restrictions on land disposition. Other constitutional issues, such as the power of the legislature to delegate authority to the land bank, can arise. Nothing in the resolution of such issues is unique to land banking, so they are not considered here. Constitutional issues that might arise because of specific types of disposition are discussed at text and notes at notes 60-61 infra.
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The University of Chicago Law Review [41:377 acquired in two ways: by condemnation or by purchase that is voluntary on the part of the seller. 47 Federal and state constitutions impose particular limitations on the disposition of land acquired through the exercise of eminent domain. 48 Judicial interpretations of these restrictions, however, have resulted in a broad scope of permissible dispositions. 49 The basic constitutional limitation on the power of a sovereign to condemn land is that the land must be taken for a public use or public purpose 0° This restraint limits disposition because land may not be condemned under the guise of a public purpose and then disposed of for a private use. An acceptable public use, as currently defined, must serve a legitimate governmental objective and be a reasonable means to achieve that objective. 51 Courts give great deference to legislative definitions of public purposes and reasonable means to achieve those purposes. 52 In land banking the legislative goals stated above are certainly legitimate public objectives, and individual dispositions are likely to be held reasonable means of serving those objectives. 3 Constitutional restrictions on the eminent
47 See text and notes at notes 9-11 supra. It is not clear at present to what extent each method of acquisition will be used. Eminent domain may be necessary only to acquire the last parcel of land from a holdout owner seeking to extort a high price from the government. The threat of condemnation and the lower price it usually brings may be enough to force most owners to sell voluntarily. The type of acquisition may depend on whether the land bank acquires the land secretly through agents or after an open announcement of purpose; the latter course of action might tend to elevate the price. 52 Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia or the States legislating concerning local affairs. This principle admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one. Id. at 32. 53 The Puerto Rico land banking system was upheld on this basis in Commonwealth v. Rosso, 95 P.R.R.
(1967):
Once there has been a legislative declaration or declaration by the delegated entity that there is a public utility, within the present meaning of the concept, the courts cannot intervene with the manner and the means which the legislature or its delegated entitites choose to exercise the power of condemnation, nor with the selection made respecting what properties are to be condemned. Id. at 524.
The level of reasonable relation that must be established here is considerably lower than domain power will thus invalidate only the most flagrant misuses of condemned land. However land is acquired, land banking is subject to a constitutional limitation because it is an exercise of the police power. 5 4 The principal limitation on that power requires that it be exercised reasonably 55 and for the public welfare. 6 The public welfare restriction, like the public purpose requirement applied to land obtained by eminent domain, is generally easily satisfied. 57 Similarly, the reasonableness test, like the reasonable means test applied to land obtained by eminent domain, usually will not be a significant restriction." s The reasonableness test, however, is more strictly applied where dispositions achieve the exclusion of certain racial or economic groups from a region. The exercise of the police power in such a discriminatory manner has been held to be a denial of due process in zoning cases, 59 and discrimination in disposition by the land bank is also proscribed.
Land banking is also subject to restrictions imposed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. Challenges will probably arise when dispositions allegedly discriminate unlawfully against economic groups. 6 0 All dispositions that establish prices for land and subsequent uses discriminate to some extent, but the point at which discrimination becomes constitutionally impermissible is difficult to determine 0 ' Full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of that embodied in the "fairly debatable" standard used for review of the relation of land dispositions to statutory objectives. See text and notes at notes 90-91 infra.
54 [Tihe States have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal police, including in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their people." Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 683 (1882). 55 
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The University of Chicago Law Review [41:377 this comment; it is sufficient to note that only in extreme cases will dispositions be subject to invalidation as denying equal protection to certain economic groups.
The ease with which the constitutional requirements on land banking are met suggests that they do not provide adequate protection against misuse of land banking authority.
III. NONCONSTITUTIONAL REvIEW OF MISDEVELOPMENT
The basic nonconstitutional limitation on the disposition of banked land is that the disposition be within the statutory authorization. Dispositions will be authorized only if they further the statutory objectives of the system. The purpose of this section is to define a technique of judicial review by which a court may determine whether a particular disposition complies with the statutory objectives.
A. Judicial Review Under the Development Plan
The purpose of the land bank development plan is to achieve in the specific area to be developed 6 3 the general objectives outlined in enabling legislation. Many land dispositions will be either directed by or in conflict with the plan, 4 and the plan will provide some indication of whether a challenged disposition is consistent with the statutory objectives. To determine the weight to be given the plan, it is necessary to determine whether it should be classified as a legislative rule that defines the objectives or an interpretative rule that does not have the force of law." 5 The plan will usually not be a legislative rule. 66 If the development plan were characterized as a legislative rule, there would be a a legislative rule only if there is a grant of authority by the legislature to the agency to make rules having the force of law, 6 7 and land bank statutes generally do not grant such authority. 8 In the typical case, the development plan must therefore be treated as an interpretative rule. The issue for the courts is then the extent to which they should accept the specific requirements of the plan as an expression of the statutory objectives.
Two factors inherent in the development plan suggest that the court should give it substantial weight in reviewing a specific disposition. First, courts have generally recognized that they must refrain from substitution of judgment in matters of agency expertise. 69 The creation of a development plan that will achieve the statutory objectives requires both technical expertise and an understanding of the competing public interests that will be affected, 70 and it will generally be beyond the competence of a court to evaluate such a plan. 7 1 The second factor suggesting that judicial deference is appropriate is thoroughness in the consideration and adoption of the plan. 72 The formulation of the plan is preceded by a comprehensive study of the current and future needs and conditions of the area. The plan is conlimited scope of review: whether the rule is within the power of the agency, is reasonable, and was issued by proper procedure. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 65, at § 5.05; cf. In re DaLomba's Case, 352 Mass. 598, 603, 227 N.E.2d 513, 517 (1967). 67 1 K. DAvis, supra note 65, at § 5.05. 08 Some land bank statutes, for example those of Kentucky and Puerto Rico, contain no provision at all for the making of a development plan. Others authorize planning in language that makes the effect of the plan unclear. The Ohio statute, for example, empowers the agency to "[e]ngage in planning for the new community district, and prepare or approve a development plan therefore, and engage in land acquisitions and land development in accordance with such plan or plans," OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 349.06(0) (Page Supp. 1973), but also authorizes the agency to acquire and dispose of land "on such terms and in such manner as it considers proper." Id. § 349.06(A) & (B). It is probably undesirable to give the plan the force of law in reviewing dispositions; no planning document should be enshrined as a legislative plan, because development planning for the land bank is an ongoing process. See text and notes at notes 17-18 supra. Treating the plan as an interpretative rule gives weight to planning in review of dispositions but does not preclude flexibility. See generally F. CHAPIN, URBAN LAND UsE PLANNING (1965) .
If the development plan were characterized as legislative, dispositions would still ultimately be judged against the legislative objectives. A legislative rule must be within the authority of the agency, so a plan that did not accord with the objectives would be of no weight either in support of or in opposition to a disposition. 
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structed only after consideration of all relevant information. Adoption of a development plan will usually require compliance with elaborate administrative procedures, including public distribution, hearings, opportunity for public comment, and review by higher authorities.
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These procedures give the plan many of the attributes of a legislative rule and suggest that it should be accorded substantial deference. An examination of the principles applied in zoning law also indicates that the development plan should be given great weight in review of dispositions. This examination is appropriate because of the parallels between the land bank development plan and the zoning ordinance. In both zoning and land banking a general scheme for land use contro1
74 is adopted through a legislative-type process 75 pursuant to a legislative grant of authority 76 in furtherance of certain public objectives. 77 Actions may be taken under the guidance of the general scheme 7 8 or as a change in policy; 79 the general plan is not strictly binding. 80 Challenges to specific actions must allege that there is deviation from the 76 For a discussion of the agencies to which land banking powers can be delegated and their authority, see text and notes at notes 9-11 supra. Every state legislature has delegated the power to zone to municipal governments. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at § 3.09. There has been little dispute over the legitimacy of this delegation. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 501, 509, 128 A. 181, 185 (1925) .
77 The zoning power is exercised, in general terms, for the public welfare. Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 332, 431 P.2d 559, 562 (1967). The land bank objectives are discussed at notes 12-16 supra, and their implications at notes 17-18 supra. While these objectives are not as broad as the "public welfare," they are usually phrased in language broad enough to approach that concept. E.g., Statement of Motives, P.R. Acts, May 16, 1962, No. 3. 78 The land bank development plan may direct a disposition pattern. In zoning cases, amendments have been upheld where they were enacted pursuant to the community's comprehensive plan. Malafronte v. Planning and Zoning Bd., 155 Conn. 205, 230 A.2d 606 (1967). 79 Changed conditions may require an alteration of the land bank's policy. This policy is as valid here as in the case of a zoning amendment: "There can be no question but that the municipality has the right to amend its zoning ordinance from time to time as new and changing conditions warrant and require such revision.... To hold otherwise would be to fix cities' development in the mould of the first zoning ordinances enacted." Jardine v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 76, 248 P. 225, 229 (1926) . 80 The land bank agency is usually not authorized by statute to create a binding plan. See text and notes at notes 66-68 supra. As discussed in note 79 supra, the comprehensive zoning plan may be amended as required.
general plan in a manner that conflicts with the legitimate objectives of the activity. 8 ' Early zoning cases, because of the merely semi-official status of master plans 2 and a general judicial distrust of planning, 8 3 gave master zoning plans little weight. As a practical matter, this result was appropriate; in the early period of zoning, many zoning governments were without professional planning expertise. 8 4 As such expertise has become more readily available, however, plans have been given greater weight in reviewing zoning actions. 8 5 A zoning ordinance is normally presumed to be a valid exercise of the authority delegated to the zoning government. 6 The general principle is that an ordinance will not be invalidated so long as it is within the realm of fair debate that the ordinance reasonably serves the objectives of zoning. 8 7 This principle is derived from the basic concept that, within constitutional limits, the determination of questions of land control policy is properly for the legislature and the authorities to which the questions are delegated, not for the courts. 8 8 A court reviewing a land bank disposition should likewise respect the legislative delegation of the responsibility to determine development policy. After it has been determined that the plan is to be given significant weight in a determination of the specific objectives of the system, it is necessary to examine the precise way in which the courts should undertake review of specific dispositions.
I. Dispositions Directed by the Development Plan.
Land dispositions, like other exercises of the police power, should initially be presumed to be in furtherance of legitimate statutory policies. 8 9 The plaintiff attacking a disposition will then bear the burden of persuading the 81 As to land banking, see text and notes at notes 30-2 supra. The allegation in a spot zoning case is that the government has singled out the property of an individual for special benefit in derogation of the general zoning scheme and the public welfare. court that the disposition is not within the prescribed aims of land banking. 9 0 The land bank will be able to support the validity of the disposition by showing that it is directed by the development plan. The plan provides substantial evidence of the validity of the disposition within the legislative policy. 9 ' The plaintiff may rebut the effect of the plan by showing that the development plan, or at least the portion of it relating to the disposition in question, does not in fact accord with the legislative objectives. 9 2 Attacking the plan itself, however, is a much heavier burden for the plaintiff to meet than simply demonstrating that a particular disposition is not within the statutory objectives . 3 The plan thus increases significantly the plaintiff's burden where the particular disposition is directed by the plan.
Dispositions Inconsistent with the Development Plan.
One doctrine employed in spot zoning cases-the change or mistake ruleplaces primary importance on the comprehensive plan 94 in defining the validity of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, but still allows some flexibility. A municipal zoning body may amend its zoning ordinance on a showing of a mistake in the original enactment of the ordinance or changed conditions in the area. 95 The rationale for the change or mistake rule is that a decision concerning a proper use of land that is inconsistent with the determination embodied in the orignal ordinance is inherently suspect. 9 " The party favoring the amendment bears the burden of showing the existence of a change or mistake sufficient to justify such an inconsistency.
A similar doctrine is appropriate in the case of an attack on a disposition inconsistent with the development plan. The challenger would bear the initial burden of showing a conflict between-the disposition and the plan. The burden then shifts to the land bank to establish that the particular disposition complies with the statutory objectives despite conflict with the development plan. Although there are likely to be several possible dispositions that comply with the statutory objectives, the change or mistake doctrine presumes that the plan expresses the disposition pattern that most fully complies with the statute and requires that changed circumstances 9 7 or the need to correct a mistake 98 justify any inconsistencies between the disposition and the plan. Application of this doctrine would limit ill-considered or improperly motivated dispositions and would encourage the land bank to engage in continuing planning, with periodic revisions of the plan as conditions change.
B. Judicial Review of Discretionary Dispositions
In practice, few cases will involve dispositions that clearly are directed by or in conflict with the development plan. Many parts of the plan will define only general goals, or provide a number of options, thus leaving the land bank with considerable discretion over particular dispositions. In these cases, the courts should draw on review techniques developed in spot zoning cases.
Spot zoning involves amendments to a general zoning ordinance that affect small parcels of land. An amendment may represent either a change in policy due to changed circumstances in the community 0 0 or the first time a land use policy is affirmatively applied to a tract.
1 1 0 The latter is often the case where land in a developing area is changed from an agricultural or other holding classification to a developable category, 10 2 similar to the land bank's disposition of land formerly in a holding zone. A spot zoning amendment is always a legislative act. 03 A particular land bank disposition may be legislative or administrative, depending on the form of the land bank agency. The definition of general disposition patterns will nearly always be legislative in nature, 104 cials. Even where the disposition decision is made by an official, however, it will have a legislative-type purpose-the achievement of general public objectives-rather than the administrative-type purpose of alleviation of special hardship on individuals, as is the case, for example, with zoning variances. 1°5 The general test used by courts in reviewing spot zoning amendments is whether it is fairly debatable that the amendment is related to the general welfare. 10 In applying this test, the courts generally impose three requirements that are particularly useful in review of land bank dispositions. First, there must be substantial evidence that the action is reasonable. 10 7 Second, the way in which the determination is made must be indicative of a reasoned decision. 10 8 Third, the action must not be solely for the benefit of an individual or small group. 1 0 9
1. Substantial Evidence of Reasonableness. Under the first test for spot zoning, there must be substantial evidence that the amendment is a reasonable exercise of the police power. 110 Many factors are considered relevant to this determination.'". Often mentioned are the density and nature of surrounding land, 112 the relation between the amended use and surrounding uses, 11 3 the needs of the area, 114 the availability of public services, 115 and the effect of the change in use on the value of neighboring property.11"
In the case of land banking it is similarly appropriate to require substantial evidence of compliance with statutory objectives. Because the land involved will usually be less developed than in zoning cases, different factors will be relevant. The needs or the region for the use pre- 100 See text and note at note 87 supra. 107 See text and notes at notes 110-116 infra.
108 See text and notes at notes 117-122 infra.
